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SSDT (System Service Descriptor Table)
NewZwOpenKey
ZwOpenKey
Install the address of NewZwOpenKeyExecution is redirected
• Malware registers its own function (i.e. hook) into the 
target location
• Later, data in the hook site is loaded into EIP, and the 
execution is redirected into malware’s own function.
an example of SSDT hooking
3Hooking is an important attack vector
• malware often needs to install hooks to 
implement illicit functionalities
– Rootkits want to intercept and tamper with critical 
system states
– Network sniffers and stealth backdoors intercept 
network stack
– Spyware, keyloggers and password thieves need to 
know when sensitive info arrives 
4Hooking Techniques Are Evolving
• Old Technique: SSDT, IDT, IAT, EAT, etc.
– Defeated by many existing hook detection tools
• New trend: function pointers in kernel data structures
– IO completion routines
– APC queues
– Threads saved context
– Protocol Characteristics Structures
– Driver Object callback pointers
– Timers
– DPC kernel objects
– DPC scheduled from ISR
– IP Filter driver hook
– Exception handlers
– Data buffer callback routines
– TLS callback routines
– Plug and play notifications
– All kinds of WDM driver stuff
– Many more, …
5Advantages of Function Pointer Hooking
• Attack space is vast
– ~20,000 function pointers in Windows kernel
• Hard to locate and validate
– ~7,000 in dynamically allocated memory regions
– Many of them in polymorphic data structures
– A polymorphic hash table in Windows kernel











• Given the binary distribution of an OS kernel, 
automatically generate a hook detection 
policy
– Locate function pointers
• Deal with polymorphic data structures
– Validate function pointers
• only 3% ever change in their lifetime (from our 
analysis)
• Simple policy: check if constant function pointers ever 
change
8System Overview
Analysis Subsystem Detection Subsystem
9Monitor Engine
• Goal: determine concrete memory layout
– For each static/dynamic memory object, determine primitive types for 
each memory word
– Primitive types: NULL, FP, CFP, DATA
• Solution:
– Monitor memory objects









Monitor Engine: Monitor Memory Objects
• Run the guest OS within TEMU 
– TEMU: a whole-system binary analysis platform, based on QEMU

































Monitor Engine: Track Function Pointers
2. IDA Pro plugin processes Relocation and 
Import Address Tables
3. Identifies and taints initial function pointers
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• Goal: Infer abstract memory layout
• Approach: context-sensitive abstraction
– Notion: Object creation context is  the execution context 
where an object is created (e.g., caller of malloc)
• Binary point of view: return addresses on the call stack
– Rationale: Objects created under the same context have the 
same type
– Solution: Merge concrete layouts with the same context 
into an abstract layout
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– Enforce the hook detection policy on user’s machine
• Solution:
– Monitor memory objects
• Hook the same set of functions
– Apply the abstract layout
• Use the return addresses as the key to the abstract layout
• Implementation:
– Kernel module vs. Hypervisor
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• Aspects to Evaluate
– Attack Space
– Analysis subsystem:  policy coverage
– Detection subsystem:
• realworld rootkits/performance/false alarms
• Experimental Setup
– Host machine: 3.0GHz CPU 4 GB RAM Ubuntu








•Total of three 25 minute runs, a snapshot every 15 seconds
•Runs 1 and 2 used to generate abstract templates policy
•For each snapshot in Run 3
Coverage = Number of Function Pointers identified by Policy / Total 
number of Function Pointers
•Level indicates context sensitivity, i.e. # of return addresses
Policy Generation Performance: 70 seconds / snapshot, ~4hours for 200 
snapshots
20
Evaluation: Realworld Rootkit Detection
21
Evaluation: Performance of Detection Subsystem
* No false alarms were raised during the testing period
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Limitations
• Coverage – what if people exploit the 5% that is not 
covered?
• Detection Interval – is 5s or even 1s frequent 
enough?
• Uncommon Proprietary Device Drivers – HookScout
utilizes QEMU and since other proprietary drivers are 
never installed, they are not analyzed.
• Limited test cases for the dynamic analysis






















• Function pointer hooking is a new trend
– Large attack space
– Hard to detect
– Without OS source code, even harder
• We developed HookScout
– Binary-centric: deal with OS binary code
– Context-sensitive: deal with type polymorphsim
– Proactive: detect attacks in advance
